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Economic theory has identified a number of channels through which openness to international financial
flows could raise productivity growth. However, while there is a vast empirical literature analyzing
the impact of financial openness on output growth, far less attention has been paid to its effects on
productivity growth. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between financial openness
and total factor productivity (TFP) growth using an extensive dataset that includes various measures
of productivity and financial openness for a large sample of countries. We find that de jure capital
account openness has a robust positive effect on TFP growth. The effect of de facto financial integration
on TFP growth is less clear, but this masks an important and novel result. We find strong evidence
that FDI and portfolio equity liabilities boost TFP growth while external debt is actually negatively
correlated with TFP growth. The negative relationship between external debt liabilities and TFP growth
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I. Introduction 
A central debate in international finance is whether openness to foreign capital has 
significant growth benefits and whether, in the case of developing countries, these benefits 
outweigh the risks. In theory, there are a number of direct and indirect channels through which 
financial openness should increase economic growth. Yet there is little robust empirical evidence 
of a causal link between financial openness and economic growth. This is not for want of effort--
a number of empirical studies have attempted to systematically examine whether financial 
openness contributes to growth using various approaches. The majority of these studies, 
however, tend to find no effect or at best a mixed effect for developing countries (see Kose et al., 
2008, for an extensive survey).  
The failure of most empirical studies to detect these presumed growth benefits has been 
used as ammunition by the critics of financial globalization who view unfettered capital flows as 
a serious impediment to global financial stability (e.g., Rodrik, 1998; Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 
2004). By contrast, proponents of financial globalization argue that increased openness to capital 
flows has, by and large, proven essential for countries aiming to upgrade from lower to middle 
income status, while also enhancing stability among industrialized countries (e.g., Fischer, 1998; 
Summers, 2000). This is clearly a matter of considerable policy relevance, especially with major 
emerging market economies like China and India opening up their capital accounts and even a 
number of low-income countries experiencing large cross-border financial flows. 
This paper attempts to change the direction of this debate by focusing on the impact of 
financial openness on productivity growth, rather than output growth. Why does financial 
openness have the potential to enhance aggregate efficiency and, by extension, total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth? Recent studies suggest that there are many channels through which 
financial openness can have a positive impact on productivity growth. For example, Kose et al. 
(2008) identify a set of indirect benefits of financial openness and argue that these could have a 
positive impact on TFP growth because they lead to more efficient resource allocation (also see 
Mishkin, 2006). These indirect “collateral” benefits could include development of the domestic 
financial sector, improvements in institutions (defined broadly to include governance, the rule of 
law etc.), better macroeconomic policies etc., all of which could result in higher growth through 
gains in allocative efficiency. Moreover, an earlier literature has argued that certain types of - 2 - 
 
capital flows such as foreign direct investment (FDI) can yield productivity gains in recipient 
countries directly through transfers of technology and managerial expertise.  
The nature of the relationship between financial openness and TFP growth has important 
welfare implications, especially in light of the recent literature emphasizing the role of TFP 
growth as the main driver of long-term per capita income growth. Although the earlier literature 
argued that factor accumulation is the key determinant of economic growth, a consensus is 
building that TFP growth is far more important than factor accumulation (Hall and Jones, 1999).
1  
In parallel to this shift in the broader growth literature, the classical notion that capital 
mobility allows capital-poor countries to grow faster by relaxing the constraints on domestic 
investment has also been challenged. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) argue that capital controls 
constitute only a transitory distortion since even a financially closed economy can eventually 
accumulate capital domestically and so the distortion vanishes over time. Hence, viewing the 
benefits of financial openness as being equivalent to a permanent reduction in this distortion may 
be an overstatement of the benefits. In other words, the direct welfare or growth gains from 
capital mobility are likely to be small. Instead, the theory implies that the benefits from financial 
openness should be reflected in TFP growth. 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between financial 
openness and productivity growth using an extensive dataset that includes various measures of 
productivity and financial openness for a large number of developed and developing countries. 
We distinguish between de jure capital account openness—the absence of restrictions on capital 
account transactions—and de facto financial integration, which we measure by stocks of foreign 
assets and liabilities relative to GDP. We find that economies with more open capital accounts 
generally have higher TFP growth. More importantly, our formal econometric analysis suggests 
that capital account openness has a causal effect on TFP growth even after controlling for the 
standard determinants of growth. This effect is robust to alternative regression specifications, the 
inclusion of a large set of control variables, and attempts to control for potential endogeneity. On 
                                                 
1 Also see Easterly and Levine (2001), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) and Parente and Prescott 
(2005). Jones and Olken (2008) present evidence that TFP growth fluctuations constitute the primary 
determinant of not just long-term but also short-term growth. Bosworth and Collins (2003), by contrast, 
argue that previous studies over-estimate the importance of TFP growth; they argue that factor 
accumulation and TFP growth are about equally important, even for long-run growth. Caselli (2005) 
contends that factor accumulation can not explain observed differences in growth across countries but that 
this may simply reflect problems in measurement of factors and how they enter the production function. - 3 - 
 
the other hand, overall de facto financial integration does not seem to matter for TFP growth. 
However, this conclusion turns out to mask a novel and interesting result. When we disaggregate 
the financial integration measure into stocks of liabilities attributable to different types of 
underlying capital flows, we find strong evidence that FDI and portfolio equity boost TFP 
growth while debt is negatively correlated with GDP growth. The negative relationship between 
stocks of external debt liabilities and TFP growth is partially attenuated in economies with 
better-developed financial markets and better institutional quality. 
Our paper is closely related to Bonfiglioli (2007), which is the only other empirical 
macro study we are aware of that analyzes the impact of overall financial integration on TFP 
growth. Her findings, based on cross-country data over the period 1975-99, also suggest that 
financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity growth. Our paper is 
complementary to hers in that we use a more comprehensive and updated dataset. More 
importantly, as noted above, we use a wide array of de jure and de facto financial openness 
measures to provide a number of additional important results on how the nature of financial 
integration and the composition of external liabilities influences TFP growth. 
This enables us to connect our results to an earlier literature focusing on the impact of 
specific types of capital flows on TFP growth. There is a strong presumption that FDI should 
yield productivity gains for domestic firms through several channels including imitation 
(adoption of new production methods), skill acquisition (education/training of labor force), and 
competition (efficient use of existing resources by domestic firms). Using cross-country data, 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998) conclude that FDI increases an economy’s productive 
efficiency (also see de Mello, 1999; Xu, 2000). There is a larger literature studying the 
productivity enhancing effects of FDI using firm- or sector-level data (see Haskell et al., 2007, 
and references therein). Javorcik (2004) and others find evidence that FDI raises productivity 
growth through vertical spillovers, which stem from the interactions between foreign firms and 
their local suppliers (backward linkages) and customers (forward linkages), rather than 
horizontal spillovers, which are associated with productivity spillovers from foreign firms to 
domestic firms in the same sector.
2 There is also some work looking at the effects of equity 
                                                 
2 Gorg and Greenaway (2004) and Lipsey and Sjoholm (2005) survey the evidence on FDI spillovers. In a 
recent contribution, Levchenko, Ranciere and Thoenig (2008) contend that financial openness has no 
effect on industry-level TFP growth in the manufacturing sector.  - 4 - 
 
market liberalizations on productivity growth. For instance, Henry and Sasson (2008) find that 
equity market liberalizations are associated with an increase in the growth rate of labor 
productivity in emerging market economies (also see Mitton, 2006).  
  In the next section of the paper, we discuss the main features of our dataset and briefly 
review the mechanics of our growth accounting exercise. In Section III, we present a set of 
stylized facts about the relationship between financial integration and TFP growth. In Section IV, 
we examine this relationship using various empirical methods and in Section V we subject our 
main results to a battery of robustness tests. We conclude with a brief summary of our findings 
and their implications in Section VI. 
 
II. Methodology and Data 
  Our approach in this paper is to rely on a dynamic panel regression framework. While 
this approach has some limitations, it enables us to provide a broad-brush characterization of the 
effects of financial openness on TFP growth at the macroeconomic level. When using dynamic 
panel methods on cross-country data, there are two major conceptual and econometric issues we 
need to contend with.  
  The first relates to the point made by Henry (2007) that capital account liberalization 
should have only a temporary positive effect on productivity growth. This point is analytically 
correct, but it leaves open the possibility that the transition to a new steady state could take a 
long time, measured in decades not years, especially for countries that are far from the 
technology frontier. To move beyond very short-term effects and examine if financial openness 
has a sustained (even if not permanent) effect on productivity growth, our analysis focuses on 
low-frequency data (non-overlapping ten-year growth rates). This is a relevant horizon not just 
for capturing more than purely transitory and business cycle effects but may also signal the 
importance of capital account liberalization in triggering a productivity take-off.  
  The second potential problem is that of reverse causality—the possibility that higher 
productivity growth attracts more foreign capital—and the related problem of endogeneity—
productivity growth and capital inflows could both be responding to some other forces. 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) find that, among developing countries, net capital inflows 
(measured as the negative of current account balances) are negatively correlated with 
productivity growth, which is evidence against the type of reverse causality that could undercut - 5 - 
 
our results. However, Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) find that, despite evidence of 
“uphill” net flows of capital from developing to industrial countries, private capital flows—
especially FDI—do tend to follow productivity growth (but during the 2000s, the picture 
becomes less clear even for FDI flows). Since our primary focus is on private capital flows, we 
cannot dismiss either of these potential econometric problems lightly.
3  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find an appropriate instrument at the country level—a 
variable that, in principle, influences financial integration but not TFP growth. Hence, we tackle 
the endogeneity issue, in the presence of unobserved country fixed effects, using the system 
GMM approach of Blundell and Bond (1998), which uses suitable lagged levels and lagged first 
differences of the regressors as instruments. This is admittedly a mechanical approach to dealing 
with endogeneity but it is econometrically sound, has been widely used in a variety of different 
contexts, and has some intuitive appeal. Indeed, Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) emphasize 
the numerous advantages of using this method in empirical growth studies. 
We study the empirical link between financial openness and TFP growth using a large 
sample of industrial and developing countries. We use the latest version of the Penn World 
Tables (Version 6.2, Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006) and supplement that with data from 
various other sources, including databases maintained by the World Bank and IMF. All data are 
in constant (2000) international prices. Out dataset comprises annual data over the period 1966–
2005 for 67 countries—21 industrial and 46 developing. The latter group includes many 
emerging market economies, while the group of industrial countries corresponds to a sub-sample 
of the OECD economies for which data used in the empirical analysis are available.  
  The total factor productivity measure we use is based on the standard growth accounting 
framework (see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). Consider the standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function written as:  
      =
1 ) (HL AK Y  
                                                 
3 Razin, Sadka and Tong (2005) note that, in a bilateral context, host country FDI inflows should increase 
if the host country has a positive productivity shock. But they argue that this may be offset by the reduced 
outflows from the source country through a total profitability effect due to changes in input prices in that 
country, implying that endogeneity is not an obvious problem even in a reduced-form formulation linking 
FDI and productivity. Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2008) find that countries that finance more of their 
investment domestically, rather than relying on foreign capital, have on average recorded higher growth 
rates than those with lower “self-financing” ratios.  - 6 - 
 
where Y is aggregate output, A is total factor productivity, K and H denote the aggregate stocks 
of physical and human capital respectively, and L is the number of workers.
4 With time series 
data on Y, K, H, and L, and an estimate of the parameter   , which is the share of capital in total 
national income, it is straightforward to calculate TFP. We construct these series using data from 
the Penn World Tables Version 6.2. Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), we estimate 
the initial values of capital stocks and then use the standard capital formation equation, assuming 
an annual depreciation rate of 6 percent, to calculate each period’s capital stock. We also 
estimate human capital stocks based on a Mincerian function of returns to schooling (with a 
Mincerian return parameter of 0.085 for each additional year of schooling) using the Barro and 
Lee (2000) cross-country dataset on schooling attainment. We extrapolate these authors’ data for 
the period after 2000 using the average growth rate of schooling attainment for each country.  
  This framework also allows for an accounting decomposition of the growth of output per 
worker into the contributions attributable to three components—TFP growth, capital deepening 
(change in the ratio of K to Y), and human capital accumulation (change in H):  
 
  / /
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In our analysis, the parameter    is assumed to be one-third, following the standard practice in 
the literature. Gollin (2002) argues that, once one correctly accounts for self-employment 
income, capital income shares are in fact remarkably similar across countries and stable over 
time within countries (also see Bernanke and Gurkaynak, 2002). Nevertheless, in our empirical 
work, we will consider alternative measures of capital shares for each country in order to 
examine the sensitivity of our results to the choice of this parameter.  
To measure financial openness, we employ both de jure and de facto measures. Our 
benchmark measure of de jure capital account openness is a binary indicator that takes a value of 
one when the capital account is open; otherwise, it takes a value of zero. This classification is 
based on information contained in the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on 
                                                 
4 Caselli and Feyrer (2007) argue that it is important to account for inputs such as land and natural 
resources when comparing marginal products of capital across countries. Since our focus is on 
productivity growth and the stock of land in a country is stable, this is not a major issue for our analysis.  - 7 - 
 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) (Schindler, 2007). Our 
benchmark measure of de facto financial integration is the ratio of gross stocks of external 
liabilities to GDP—a cumulated measure of inflows that is most closely related to the notion of 
openness to foreign capital that could be associated with technological and other spillovers. We 
also consider alternative measures of integration and the roles played by various components of 
aggregate gross stocks of external assets and liabilities. These measures are primarily from Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2006) External Wealth of Nations Database. In sensitivity tests for our 
empirical results, we will consider other measures of capital account openness as well.  
Kose et al. (2008) discuss the relative merits and drawbacks of each of these measures of 
financial openness. The de jure measure is relevant for analysis of the effects of capital account 
liberalization policies. But the existence of capital controls often does not accurately capture an 
economy’s actual level of integration into international financial markets. The intensity and 
effectiveness of enforcement of capital controls are not reflected in simple indicator measures. 
Many countries with extensive capital controls have still experienced massive outflows of private 
capital, while some economies with open capital accounts have recorded few capital inflows or 
outflows. The de facto measure may be conceptually more appropriate to the extent that we are 
interested in the effects of an outcome-based measure of financial integration. It also allows us to 
obtain a finer characterization of the degree of financial openness of different economies and to 
analyze the effects of different types of capital flows. On the other hand, many of the indirect 
benefits of financial integration may be vitiated by the presence of capital controls. In view of 
these conceptual issues and the controversy surrounding the choice of the “right” measure, we 
will examine both types of measures of financial openness.
5 
We also consider several additional control variables in our regression analysis, including 
trade openness, changes in the terms of trade, institutional quality, and financial sector 
development. We face the usual problems in measuring these variables, especially the last two, 
which are important for our analysis. Given that there is little consensus on this issue, we simply 
follow the literature in using the ratio of private sector credit to GDP as a rough measure of 
financial development (or financial depth), fully recognizing that this measure has shortcomings 
                                                 
5 Collins (2007) argues that de jure measures are less subject to endogeneity concerns than de facto 
indicators. Aizenman and Noy (2008) examine the relationship between de jure and de facto measures of 
financial openness. - 8 - 
 
but it has the advantage of being available on a reasonably consistent basis across a large group 
of countries and over a long period. Similarly, we use a broad measure of institutional quality 
that is the sum of the three key indexes from the International Country Risk Guide (corruption, 
law and order, and bureaucratic quality) and takes on values from 0 to 18.  
 
III. Basic Stylized Facts 
We begin by presenting some basic stylized facts about the relationship between the 
degree of financial integration and TFP growth. In addition to analyzing the link between these 
two variables for the full sample (1966-2005), we consider whether the nature of this relationship 
has changed over time by dividing the full sample into two sub-periods: 1966-1985 and 1986-
2005. The mid-1980s represent a break-point in many respects—a number of countries began to 
undertake trade and financial liberalization programs around this period; the dramatic surge in 
international financial flows across industrial countries as well as between industrial and 
developing countries got started; and the Great Moderation (the decline in business cycle 
volatility across all groups of countries, especially the industrial ones) began. For the descriptive 
analysis in this section, we divide our sample into two coarse groups—more financially open 
(MFO) economies and less financially open (LFO) economies. The group of MFO economies 
includes those with above-median levels of financial openness and LFO economies are those 
with below-median levels. The cross-sectional median of financial openness is based on the 
average level of financial openness for each country over the full sample period.  
We performed the standard growth accounting exercise (described in Section II) for each 
country in our sample. Figure 1a shows the cross-sectional medians of labor productivity growth 
and the median contributions of the three components separately for the MFO and LFO 
economies, with these two groups being separated on the basis of a de facto measure of financial 
integration (gross stocks of liabilities relative to GDP). The contribution of TFP growth to per-
worker output growth is larger in the MFO economies. Indeed, consistent with the literature on 
the importance of TFP growth, this factor is on average the most important contributor to growth 
over the last four decades. The results are similar when we use a de jure measure of capital 
account openness to split the sample into MFO and LFO groups, using a similar sample-median 
criterion based on this openness measure as the cutoff between the two groups (Figure 1b). These - 9 - 
 
figures present the growth contributions of TFP and factors of production after scaling the 
growth rates with the relevant share coefficients. 
Figure 2 presents the growth contributions of various components over time and across 
the groups of MFO and LFO countries. We again assume that the MFO and LFO split is based 
on the median value of the de facto financial integration measure for the full sample. In other 
words, there is no change in the composition of the groups over time. On average, MFO 
economies enjoyed faster productivity growth over the recent period of financial globalization. 
While physical and human capital accumulation were the largest contributors to GDP growth in 
the earlier period, the contribution of TFP growth increased dramatically during the globalization 
period. By contrast, in LFO economies, the contribution of TFP growth fell slightly during the 
globalization period and output growth was mostly attributed to the accumulation of both types 
of capital. It is also interesting to note that average output growth is rather similar between the 
two groups of economies during the globalization period, suggesting that there is no clear 
correlation between the level of financial openness and output growth, notwithstanding the sharp 
differences in the contribution shares of TFP growth.  
To examine the robustness of these observations, we conduct a number of additional 
exercises. First, we switch to using our baseline de jure measure of capital account openness 
(from Schindler, 2007) to differentiate between more and less open economies. Figure 3 shows 
that the results are robust to the use of this alternative measure of financial integration. Next, we 
relax our assumption that the composition of the groups of MFO and LFO economies has been 
constant across the two sub-periods. Allowing the composition to change based on the median 
value of financial openness for each sub-sample does not change our main results (not shown 
here; see Figures 2b and 3b in Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2008).  
The summary statistics in Table 1 confirm that, even if one focuses on just the median 
(unscaled) growth rate of TFP, it is still the case that TFP growth has typically been higher in 
MFO economies compared to LFO economies over the period 1986-2005. When we use the de 
facto financial integration measure to classify economies into LFO and MFO groups (first two 
panels of Table 1), there is virtually no difference in the median growth rates of these two groups 
in the globalization period (which is the period when the distinction between the two groups has 
more bite as overall levels of integration were quite low before the mid-1980s). There is some - 10 - 
 
evidence based on the de jure measure (third and fourth panels of Table 1) that countries with 
more open capital accounts have grown faster in the globalization period. 
These stylized facts suggest that there is a relationship between financial openness and 
TFP growth, although we have so far established just a correlation using a coarse disaggregation 
of our sample of countries. Consistent with earlier literature, however, we find little evidence 
that the degree of financial openness has a robust positive correlation with output growth.  
 
IV. Regression Results 
  We now turn to a more formal regression analysis of the relationship between financial 
openness and TFP growth. We start with some simple cross-section regressions and then move 
on to dynamic panel regressions to exploit the time series dimension of the data as well. Since 
we are interested in low-frequency changes in TFP growth rather than year-to-year or business 
cycle-related fluctuations, we use ten-year averages of the underlying annual data in the panel 
regressions, which gives us a maximum of four observations per country. In addition to the 
standard determinants of growth discussed earlier, our reduced-form regressions include a term 
controlling for the initial level of TFP.
6  
 
IV.1 Basic Results on Financial Openness and TFP Growth 
We begin with simple reduced-form cross-section regressions to more formally 
characterize the correlation between financial openness and TFP growth. The first column of 
Table 2 shows the basic cross-country regression from a growth framework. Of the variables that 
have been found by other authors to be robust in growth regressions, only three (the convergence 
term, population growth, and institutional quality) seem to matter for TFP growth. Trade 
openness and financial depth do not matter.
7 On the other hand, unlike in standard growth 
                                                 
6 Cross-country growth regressions typically include the initial level of GDP as a regressor to control for 
convergence effects. Although there is no clear theoretical reason to expect TFP convergence across 
countries, recent studies have suggested convergence to a common technology frontier. The initial level 
of TFP consistently enters our regressions with a statistically significant coefficient, so we leave it in. 
7 The coefficients on both trade openness and financial sector development are positive and statistically 
significant in a number of specifications we examine later. Since they are not the main focus of our paper, 
however, we abbreviate our discussion of these important variables. For an extended discussion of the 
relationship between trade openness and productivity, see Alcala and Ciccone (2004), and for the one 
between financial sector development and productivity, see Benhabib and Spiegel (2000).  - 11 - 
 
regressions, changes in the terms of trade do seem to be positively associated with TFP growth. 
In the second column, we augment this regression with a measure of de jure capital account 
openness. This de jure measure of course provides at best a partial representation of a country’s 
integration with international financial markets. We now add to the regressions the benchmark 
measure of de facto financial integration discussed earlier—the ratio of gross external liabilities 
to GDP. The next two columns report results using as the measure of financial openness (i) the 
ratio of gross external assets to GDP and (ii) the ratio of the sum of gross external assets and 
liabilities to GDP. In the last three columns, we include both de jure and de facto measures of 
financial openness. There is no evidence that any of these measures of financial integration 
matters for TFP growth in the cross section, which echoes the result in the broader literature that 
financial integration is not strongly correlated with GDP growth. 
Financial openness has of course changed markedly over time. To exploit the time series 
variation in the data, we now move on to using dynamic panel regressions based on ten-year 
averaged data for each country. The regression specification is as follows: 
 
, , 1 , 1 , , , ' ' i t i t i t i t i t t i i t y y y FO Z       µ           = + + + + +  
 
where yi,t is the logarithm of TFP,  yi,t-1 is the level of TFP at the beginning of each ten-year 
period, FOi,t is the set of financial openness measures, Zi,t is the set of relevant control variables, 
µt represent time dummies (for each non-overlapping ten-year period), ηi stands for the country 
fixed effects,  and εi,t  is the error term. Note that the dependent variable in this regression is TFP 
growth over the relevant ten-year period, and the control variables are growth rates (or averages, 
as the case may be) over the ten-year period.  This regression is dynamic because it could be 
rewritten using yi,t as the dependent variable and yi,t-1 as an explanatory variable. 
The first panel of Table 3 presents results from fixed effects (FE) panel regressions. The 
coefficient on the de jure measure of financial openness in the first column is significantly 
positive, implying that capital account openness is associated with higher TFP growth. When we - 12 - 
 
replace the de jure measure with various de facto measures of financial openness, none of them 
seems to matter, however.
8  
  As noted earlier, a key concern about these regressions is that TFP growth and financial 
openness may be endogenous.
9 The results in the second panel of Table 3 show that capital 
account openness matters for TFP growth even when we control for endogeneity using a version 
of the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator that includes some refinements to limit the number 
of instruments.
10 The results are similar to the FE results when we include the de jure measure of 
capital account openness by itself or in conjunction with different measures of de facto 
integration (we do not show the latter set of results here). The coefficient estimates imply that an 
economy with an open capital account has, over a ten-year horizon, annual TFP growth that is 
about 0.16 percentage points higher than an economy that has extensive capital controls. By 
contrast, as in the FE estimates, de facto financial openness is not correlated with TFP growth.  
  Why does de jure capital account openness have a positive relationship with TFP growth 
while de facto openness doesn’t? While an open capital account by itself says nothing about an 
economy’s actual level of integration into international financial markets, many of the efficiency 
gains from competition, technology transfers, spillovers of good corporate and public 
governance practices etc. may be associated with an open capital account. Indeed, some outward 
flows could represent capital flight despite the existence of controls on outflows; this could 
                                                 
8 When we included both the de jure and de facto measures simultaneously (one de facto measure at a 
time), the de facto integrations did not matter and it was still the case that de jure capital account openness 
alone is positively related to TFP growth (these results are not reported here but are available from the 
authors). 
9 This concern is on top of the fact that when we include a country fixed effect in panels with a small 
cross-section, pooled OLS and within-groups estimators will be inconsistent. The system GMM method 
that we use also addresses this issue. 
10 Roodman (2007) discusses the risks of using too many instruments in a mechanical manner, and 
suggests some criteria and procedures for limiting the set of instruments in system GMM estimation. We 
follow these procedures to reduce the number of instruments. Thus, for the difference regression that 
covers periods t and t-1, the instruments include log TFP at the beginning of t-1 and the averages in 
period t-2 of trade openness, terms of trade, population growth, private sector credit, institutional 
quality, capital account openness (de jure) and, depending on the regression equation, total liabilities, 
total assets, the sum of total liabilities and total assets, debt liabilities, and the sum of FDI and Equity 
liabilities, and their multiplicative terms. Likewise, for the levels regression corresponding to period 
t, the instruments include the difference of log TFP at the beginning of t and t-1 and the difference 
between the averages in period t-1 and the averages in period t-2 of trade openness, etc. Most 
explanatory variables are treated as endogenous; population growth, terms of trade, and de jure 
financial openness are treated as predetermined; and the time trend is treated as strictly exogenous. - 13 - 
 
reflect lack of confidence in a country’s macroeconomic policies or institutions. Similarly, 
inward flows that manage to circumvent capital account restrictions are much less likely to 
convey many of the indirect benefits of financial integration.  
Although there is little evidence that capital controls are effective at achieving their 
macroeconomic objectives beyond a short period, they are associated with substantial 
microeconomic costs that could eliminate the productivity gains associated with financial 
integration, especially if the controls are maintained for a prolonged period. For example, many 
authors have pointed out that capital controls can impose significant distortionary costs at the 
microeconomic (firm or industry) level, even if economic agents find ways to evade those 
controls (Forbes, 2007). In addition, capital controls distort the behavior of agents while valuable 
resources are wasted in seeking to circumvent them (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Moreover, 
capital controls increase the cost of engaging in international trade, even for those firms that do 
not intend to evade them, because of expenses incurred in meeting various inspection and 
reporting requirements associated with the controls (Wei and Zhang, 2007). In all of these 
circumstances, while de facto integration may not by itself convey the indirect benefits of 
financial openness that would ultimately be reflected in higher TFP growth, de jure openness 
could be instrumental in attaining the productivity gains stemming from financial integration. 
 
IV.2 Composition of Flows and Stocks 
We have so far considered aggregate measures of external liabilities and assets. There is a 
great deal of evidence, however, that not all types of flows have similar effects. A large body of 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that FDI flows, in particular, generate many of the 
indirect benefits of financial integration that we discussed earlier. Equity flows have also been 
shown to generate positive spillovers in terms of deepening and development of domestic 
financial markets, improvements in corporate governance among domestic firms etc. Debt flows, 
on the other hand, have many undesirable properties even though they do help loosen financing 
constraints at both the firm and country levels. Even at a conceptual level, debt flows lack the 
positive attributes of equity-like flows. They do not solve certain agency problems, can lead to 
inefficient capital allocation if domestic banks are poorly supervised, and generate moral hazard 
as debt is implicitly guaranteed by the government (in the case of corporate debt) and/or 
international financial institutions (both corporate and sovereign debt). Moreover, while FDI and - 14 - 
 
portfolio equity flows are more stable and less prone to reversals, the procyclical and highly 
volatile nature of debt flows, especially short-term bank loans, can magnify the adverse impact 
of negative shocks on productivity growth.
11 
We now explore the implications of different forms of financial integration based on the 
nature of these underlying capital flows. First, we return to using gross external liabilities as a 
measure of financial openness, but now split stocks of liabilities into (i) FDI and portfolio equity 
liabilities, and (ii) debt liabilities.
12 We club FDI and portfolio equity liabilities together because 
of the difficulty in telling apart the underlying flows and also because they have some common 
characteristics. They both have equity-like characteristics in terms of sharing of risk between 
investors and firms; they tend to be less volatile than debt flows; and other authors have found--
using both macro and micro data--that they have positive spillovers.  
The results from splitting up the composition of external liabilities, presented in the first 
two columns of Table 4, are striking. In both specifications, there is strong evidence that FDI and 
equity liabilities boost TFP growth while debt liabilities reduce it.
13 The GMM results indicate 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of FDI and equity liabilities to GDP would be 
associated with about a 0.4 percentage points increase in annual TFP growth over a ten-year 
period. A similar increase in the ratio of debt liabilities to GDP would be associated with TFP 
growth that is lower by about 0.2 percentage points. Another point to note is that the de jure 
measure of financial integration is no longer important for TFP growth, but we uncover this 
result and the relative importance of de facto financial integration only when we disaggregate the 
de facto openness measure by the composition of underlying flows.  
It is not surprising that, even if debt does promote capital accumulation, it may not 
increase TFP growth. But the negative coefficient signals more than just a zero effect—it implies 
that more external debt is associated with lower TFP growth. Why should debt hurt TFP growth? 
                                                 
11 See Kose et al. (2008) for a more extensive discussion and relevant references.  
12 We use only de facto openness measures here as it is difficult to get disaggregated capital control 
measures for different types of flows, especially for a dataset such as ours that covers a long time span 
and a large number of countries. 
13 We get a similar result when we use the difference between total liabilities and the sum of FDI and 
portfolio equity liabilities in place of just debt liabilities. When we split the stock of assets into the same 
two categories--FDI and portfolio equity assets and debt assets--the coefficients on both those measures 
of integration are small and statistically insignificant. Since most models about the benefits of financial 
openness—especially for non-industrial countries—focus on the role of inflows, we present results only 
for the composition of liabilities.  - 15 - 
 
It is possible that countries with weaker institutional frameworks and weakly-supervised 
financial institutions (which may not be fully captured by our composite measures of these 
characteristics) get more debt flows, which finance politically well-connected local firms that 
then grow bigger and stronger, to the detriment of other firms. This is clearly not good for 
aggregate efficiency and overall TFP growth. On the flip side, well-functioning financial markets 
and other institutions may enhance the TFP benefits of all types of flows.
14  
One way to get at these issues even using our coarse measures of financial and 
institutional development is to interact them with these two variables. In the second panel of 
Table 4, we interact the different stock measures of liabilities with a measure of financial 
development--the ratio of private credit to GDP. Focusing directly on the system GMM estimates 
in column 4, the basic coefficients on different stock variables are preserved. An interesting 
result is that there is a significant positive coefficient on the interaction between private sector 
credit and the stock of debt liabilities. That is, having well-developed financial markets 
substantially attenuates the negative impact of debt inflows on TFP growth. The size of the 
coefficients implies that the level of financial development beyond which the marginal effect of 
increases in the stock of external debt on TFP growth is positive corresponds to a credit to GDP 
ratio of nearly 150 percent, well beyond the level even in the more advanced emerging 
markets.
15 This implies that, given their level of financial development, the TFP benefits of 
financial integration are most evident in developing countries when they receive inflows in the 
form of FDI or portfolio equity rather than debt.  
In the last two columns of Table 4, we report the results of similar interactions with the 
institutional quality variable. A higher value reflects better institutions. Here again, better 
institutional quality reduces the negative impact of debt liabilities on TFP growth.
16 Somewhat 
surprisingly, we also find that improvements in institutional quality reduce the effects of FDI and 
                                                 
14 In our panel dataset, we find a weak positive (unconditional) correlation between the level of credit to 
GDP and the degree of de facto financial openness. The correlation between credit to GDP and the ratio 
of FDI plus equity liabilities to total liabilities is slightly stronger, suggesting that more financially 
developed economies receive more of their inflows in the form of FDI and equity rather than debt.  
15 This calculation involves dividing the absolute value of the coefficient on debt liabilities (-0.00383) by 
the coefficient on its interaction with the level of credit to GDP (0.00261). The mean level of private 
sector credit to GDP in our sample is 0.57 (standard deviation: 0.44) in 1996-2005.  
16 We get a similar result when we use the difference between total liabilities and the sum of FDI and 
equity liabilities in place of just debt liabilities.  - 16 - 
 
portfolio equity liabilities on TFP growth. The implication is that, when an economy has attained 
a very high level of institutional development, even FDI flows don’t make much of a difference 
to TFP growth. While these results are statistically significant, however, the coefficient estimates 
indicate that, even at the highest level of institutional quality in our sample, the estimated 
marginal effect of an increase in FDI and equity liabilities is still positive and that of an increase 
in debt liabilities is still negative.  
These results with the interaction terms suggest that there are subtle “threshold” effects in 
the data. That is, a country may need to attain a certain level of financial and institutional 
development before it can attain the full benefits of financial integration on TFP growth. This 
links up with a growing literature suggesting that the overall growth benefits of financial 
integration are higher above certain thresholds, and the risks are lower. These threshold effects 
seem to be most pertinent for external debt—the accumulation of large stocks of external debt by 
economies that have under-developed financial systems and weak institutions does little for their 
TFP growth; it could even hurt output and productivity growth by increasing the risks of crises.
17  
 
V. Extensions and Robustness Tests 
  We now extend our main results and explore their robustness by checking their 
sensitivity in a few key dimensions. First, we consider alternative measures of total factor 
productivity. Second, we look at different measures of de jure capital account openness. Third, 
we examine if the country sample used in the regressions makes a difference; in particular, we 
check if the results are different for industrial and non-industrial countries, and also check if 
there is a clear split in results between highly financially open economies and those that are less 
open. Fourth, we look at the sensitivity of our results to changes in time horizons. Finally, we 




                                                 
17 Kose, Prasad and Taylor (2008) survey this literature and provide some new results documenting the 
quantitative relevance of threshold effects. Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2005) present a theoretical 
model in which the effects of foreign debt inflows on domestic TFP depend on the level of financial 
depth. Prasad and Rajan (2008) discuss the implications of such threshold effects for capital account 
liberalization programs.  - 17 - 
 
V.1 Alternative measures of TFP 
  A key parameter choice in our construction of the TFP measure is the capital share 
parameter. In our baseline results, we have assumed that to be one-third. Some authors have 
argued that this parameter choice, which was originally based on U.S. data, is not appropriate as 
capital income shares vary widely cross countries. Based on national income accounts data for 
countries at various stages of development, this share ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. Gollin (2002) 
argues that these national accounts data do not correctly account for self-employed income (labor 
income of the self-employed is often treated as capital income) and income of small firms. 
Correcting for these two factors, the capital income shares for most developed and developing 
economies examined by Gollin cluster in the range of 0.20 to 0.35. Bernanke and Gurkaynak 
(2002) update Gollin’s work and extend it to a larger group of countries, confirming that 
choosing a common labor share of one-third is not a bad approximation. For the countries that 
are common to the two datasets, the estimated capital income shares in these two papers are 
similar but not identical. Of the 67 countries in our dataset, Gollin’s paper covers 18 and 
Bernanke and Gurkaynak’s paper covers 45.  
  We redo the TFP calculations using the Gollins capital share data; for those countries in 
our dataset for which that paper does not report capital shares, we retain our baseline share 
parameter. We then repeat this exercise using the Bernanke-Gurkaynak capital share data. Table 
5 contains the results of regressions using these alternative measures of TFP growth. Most of the 
main results are preserved. The de jure capital account openness measure is strongly significant 
when we include total liabilities to GDP as the measure of financial openness, but not when we 
split the stock of liabilities into FDI plus equity liabilities and debt liabilities. The former set of 
liabilities is still positively associated with TFP growth, although the coefficient on debt 
liabilities is significantly negative only in the FE specifications.  
 
V.2 Alternative measures of de jure capital account openness 
  In our empirical work, we have used a variety of measures of de facto financial 
integration. As noted earlier, policy-related measures of capital account restrictions capture a 
slightly different facet of financial integration than these de facto measures. We now explore 
what happens when we use alternative measures of capital account openness, rather than just the 
0-1 indicator taken from the IMF. Chinn and Ito (2006) have recently developed a finer measure - 18 - 
 
of capital account openness. They estimate a principal components model based on four 
categories of capital account restrictions for each country and interpret the first principal 
component as their composite measure of de jure capital account openness.  
  The first panel of Table 6 reports the key results using the Chinn-Ito indicator of capital 
account openness. As in our baseline regressions, the de jure measure is significant when we use 
total liabilities to GDP as the de facto openness measure (the GMM coefficient is significant at 
the 11 percent level). And the results with the FDI plus equity and debt liability stocks remain 
broadly similar to our baseline results. We also experimented with other measures, such as the 
one constructed by Edwards (2007), and found that the results were essentially the same.
18  
  We also tried a more selective indicator of de jure openness—the equity market 
liberalization measure used by authors such as Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000). 
This is a binary indicator that is set to unity when a country’s stock markets are opened up to 
foreign investors, and zero before then. Many authors have found a positive correlation between 
equity market liberalizations and GDP growth (see, e.g., Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005). 
The second panel of Table 6 shows that this particular measure of de jure capital account 
openness is not significantly correlated with TFP growth. Part of the reason might be that, for 
many emerging markets and developing countries, portfolio equity inflows are still quite small 
relative to FDI and debt flows. Hence, liberalizing this portion of capital inflows by itself may 
not yield much of an effect on TFP, particularly once we control for the total stock of liabilities.  
 
V.3 Alternative ways of splitting the sample based on country characteristics 
  The policy question about capital account liberalization is relevant mostly for non-
industrial countries since most of the OECD industrial countries already have open capital 
accounts, with few restrictions on cross-border capital flows. Although non-industrial countries 
are anyway predominant in our sample, we re-estimated the key regressions after restricting the 
sample to this group. The results are reported in Table 7. As expected, the standard errors on the 
coefficients go up relative to the baseline regressions as the sample size is smaller. The point 
                                                 
18 Note that, despite the apparent differences amongst the Chinn-Ito index and other measures of overall 
de jure capital account openness, virtually all of these measures are based on data from the same source—
the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Not 
surprisingly, these de jure measures are all highly correlated (see Schindler, 2007).  - 19 - 
 
estimate of the coefficient on de jure capital account openness is larger than in full sample results 
and it is statistically significant in the GMM specification. When we add the ratio of the stock of 
liabilities to GDP to the regression, the coefficient on that variable is negative and the coefficient 
on the de jure openness measure remains positive but is no longer significant. The coefficient on 
FDI and equity liabilities is positive but not significant; the coefficient on debt liabilities, on the 
other hand, remains negative and strongly significant. Thus, the strongest result here is again that 
debt liabilities have a negative effect on TFP growth for non-industrial countries. Until this 
decade, debt inflows dominated overall inflows into emerging markets. Even though FDI flows 
have now become more important, debt still accounts for a large portion of the stock of external 
liabilities accumulated by non-industrial countries.
19 As a consequence, for this group, the result 
for debt liabilities seems to get picked up even when we use total liabilities to GDP as the 
measure of financial openness.  
The split between industrial and non-industrial countries is largely based on the level of 
development as measured, for instance, by the national level of per capita income. At the end of 
Section V, we discussed the possibility of other thresholds based on levels of financial and 
institutional development. A different threshold could be related to the level of financial 
integration itself. When a country has limited integration with international financial markets, it 
may not see much—if any—of the benefits, either direct or indirect. That is, these benefits may 
not just be proportional to the level of integration, as implicitly assumed in the linear regression 
framework, but might be apparent only after a certain level of integration has been achieved.  
We take a first stab at this issue by dividing our sample of countries into those that have 
above-median levels of financial integration (based on gross stocks of external liabilities to 
GDP) and those that have below-median levels. We then run our basic regressions separately for 
these two groups. The results are reported in Table 8. The positive coefficient on de jure capital 
account openness (in the first two columns), the positive coefficient on the stock of FDI and 
equity liabilities, and the negative coefficient on debt liabilities are all preserved for the MFO 
economies. For the LFO economies, these coefficients are all much smaller and not statistically 
                                                 
19 In 2000-04, debt accounted for about 52 percent of gross external liabilities of emerging markets, while 
FDI accounted for 37 percent. Portfolio equity liabilities accounted for most of the remainder. In 1980-84, 
the corresponding shares for debt and FDI were 85 percent and 14 percent, respectively.  - 20 - 
 
significant.
20 This confirms the intriguing possibility that the level of financial openness itself 
constitutes an important threshold for realizing the benefits of financial integration.  
One remaining issue is whether specific characteristics of certain countries could be 
driving the results. For instance, some commodity-exporting countries receive a significant 
amount of FDI in their resource-extraction industries. This could increase TFP in those sectors 
but not in the overall economy and, in fact, could hurt overall TFP if Dutch disease effects—
exchange rate appreciation spurred by capital inflows—lead to a reallocation of resources away 
from the manufacturing sector. We included a dummy for commodity-exporting countries (based 
on a criterion of exports accounting for a large share of total exports) and also interacted it with 
the stocks of different external liabilities. In general, these additional variables made little 
difference to any of our key results. 
 
V.4 Different time horizons 
We have used non-overlapping ten-year growth rates in our baseline analysis to obviate 
the effects of short-term and business cycle fluctuations. The results at this horizon suggest that 
the effects of financial openness on TFP growth are quite persistent, in contrast to the suggestion 
by Henry (2007) that the effects are likely to be highly transitory. To investigate this issue 
further, we re-estimated the baseline regressions using growth rates at different horizons. To 
allow for easy comparability, we report results based on the fixed effects specification in the first 
column of Table 4. Table 9 shows the results for data averaged over non-overlapping 3-year, 5-
year, 7-year, 10-year and 15-year periods. The coefficients on the de jure capital account 
openness measure decline almost monotonically from 0.008 to 0.004 when we go from 3-year 
growth rates to 15-year growth rates. Similarly, the absolute values of the coefficients on FDI 
plus equity liabilities and on debt liabilities are larger at shorter horizons and decline as the 
horizon lengthens. The coefficients also become less statistically significant at longer horizons, 
which is as expected since the number of observations in the regressions shrinks at longer 
horizons. These results confirm that the effects of financial openness on TFP growth tend to wear 
off over time but are still economically and statistically significant at horizons of up to ten years, 
which makes capital account liberalization relevant as a policy tool for non-industrial countries.  
                                                 
20 We obtained very similar results when we used the de jure capital account openness variable to 
distinguish between the MFO and LFO economies.  - 21 - 
 
V.5 An alternative specification 
  In their analysis, Bonfiglioli (2008) and Henry (2007) employ a variant of the standard 




They interpret this as a difference-in-difference specification since the inclusion of country and 
time fixed effects knocks out country-specific and time-specific variation in the panel. 
  Table 10 shows the results from estimation of this specification, using three different 
measures of de jure capital account openness and three measures of de facto financial openness. 
Our core result--that an open capital account is associated with higher TFP growth--is preserved 
for two of the three de jure measures. The exception is the Bekaert-Harvey indicator—the 
coefficients on this are positive, but not quite statistically significant. We also experimented with 
the Edwards (2007) measure of de jure openness, which yielded results in line with the IMF and 
Chinn-Ito measures. Thus, we view these results as broadly supportive of our main conclusions.  
   
V.6 Other controls, outliers 
  Some authors have argued that the exchange rate regime affects GDP growth. Given that 
it is the interaction of relatively fixed exchange rate regimes and capital account liberalization 
that has triggered many currency crises, controlling for the exchange rate regime is potentially 
important for output growth, although the link is less clear for TFP growth. We replicated the full 
set of baseline results from Table 4 with this additional control--the “fine” classification of de 
facto exchange rate regimes developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), which has 15 different 
categories. The results (which we do not report here) indicate that, once we control for financial 
openness, the exchange rate regime has little additional influence on TFP growth and has only a 
marginal effect on the key coefficients of interest to us.
21  
We also conducted a battery of tests to check the sensitivity of our results to outliers. 
Rather than reporting these results in detail, we just briefly summarize the main experiments and 
results. We first eliminated all observations with financial openness values that were more than 
                                                 
21 We also controlled for terms of trade volatility and found that it did not matter. - 22 - 
 
two standard deviations from their respective full sample means. This was done in two ways—
first by eliminating only specific country-period observations that fell afoul of this rule (so a 
country could still be represented in the sample in other periods) and then by eliminating a 
country altogether from the sample if any of the observations pertaining to that country had to be 
dropped. The number of observations we dropped were typically less than 2 percent of the full 
sample of panel data. When we re-estimated the baseline regressions with these slightly smaller 
samples, the main baseline results were almost all entirely preserved. We also used the method 
proposed by Hadi (1994) for detecting outliers in multivariate regressions. Again, eliminating 
such outliers made little difference to the key results.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
  In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the relationship 
between financial openness and TFP growth. We find strong evidence that financial openness, as 
measured by de jure capital account openness, is associated with higher medium-term TFP 
growth. These results are robust to our attempts to deal with potential problems of endogeneity 
and reverse causality, leading us to the view that this may in fact be a causal relationship. But it 
is a subtle one. The level of de facto financial integration, as measured by the stock of external 
liabilities to GDP, is not correlated with TFP growth. But splitting up the stock of external 
liabilities reveals a novel and interesting result. FDI and equity inflows (cumulated over decade-
long periods) contribute to TFP growth while debt inflows have the opposite effect. We uncover 
the relationship between de facto financial integration and TFP growth, and its importance 
relative to the effects of de jure capital account openness, only when we disaggregate the 
measure of de facto financial openness in this fashion. We also find that the negative effect of 
stocks of external debt liabilities on TFP is partially attenuated in economies with better-
developed financial markets and better institutional quality.  
Why does financial openness—when measured by capital account openness or the stock 
of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities—have a significant positive effect on TFP growth, while 
the existing literature suggests that the effect of financial openness on output growth is not at all 
robust? (Obstfeld, 2008, highlights this conundrum). There are several possible reasons for this 
finding. First, the timing of the adjustment of TFP and output to greater financial integration may 
be different. TFP growth is often associated with the introduction of new technologies. If these - 23 - 
 
are general-purpose technologies simultaneously affecting a number of sectors, they could result 
in an increase in the rate of obsolescence of both physical and human capital. This could 
potentially slow down the growth rate of output in the short run, offsetting the growth-enhancing 
effects of TFP (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
Second, financial openness might influence the reallocation of outputs and inputs across 
individual producers. By affecting the return to capital, financial openness could lead to changes 
in the entry and exit decisions of firms/plants. To the extent that this does not have a negative 
effect on net entry, aggregate factor productivity will increase because new plants are more 
productive than exiting plants.
22 This reallocation from less productive to more productive plants 
would ultimately increase total factor productivity with no significant gains in employment. 
These productivity gains would increase over longer horizons since there could be additional 
gains from both learning and selection effects over longer periods. 
Third, there could be some adjustment costs that delay the realization of the positive 
effects of TFP on output growth in developing countries. As the adjustment of the capital stock 
to new technologies is completed, these effects are expected to disappear making the impact of 
financial openness on economic growth in the long run more visible. In light of the short history 
of the recent wave of financial globalization, which began in earnest only in the mid-1980s, 
perhaps it is easier to detect its positive effects on TFP growth than on output growth.   
The results in this paper point to a large and unfinished research agenda. One issue is to 
delineate more clearly the specific channels through which financial openness boosts 
productivity growth—these could include technological spillovers, higher efficiency due to 
increased competition, and improved corporate governance. A second issue is to investigate in 
more depth why de jure capital account openness delivers TFP growth benefits while de facto 
openness fails to do so. We have suggested some possible explanations but this issue remains to 
be conclusively resolved, especially since de facto openness seems to be more closely tied to 
GDP growth benefits than de jure openness.  
Another important issue is to understand better why some economies seem to attain 
larger productivity gains from financial openness. Our results suggest that this depends on the 
nature of financial flows and also on domestic financial and institutional development. 
                                                 
22 Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) study the contribution of the reallocation activity across 
individual producers in accounting for aggregate productivity growth. - 24 - 
 
Interestingly, even when we control for these domestic variables, the level of financial 
integration itself seems to make a difference--economies with higher levels of integration have 
higher marginal benefits from additional integration. There seem to be a variety of complex 
interactions among international financial integration and domestic financial sector development. 
Pursuing this issue in detail is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it for future work.  
In summary, our analysis using macroeconomic data bolsters the microeconomic 
evidence (based on firm- or industry-level data) that financial integration, especially if it takes 
the form of FDI or portfolio equity flows, leads to significant gains in efficiency and TFP 
growth. Moreover, in tandem with the recent literature showing that TFP growth rather than 
factor accumulation is the key driver of long-term growth, our results suggest that—despite all 
the skepticism surrounding it and despite all of the potential costs and risks associated with it—
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Table 1.  Sample Statistics: Median Values by Country Group 
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) 
 
More Financially Open Economies (MFO)
Real GDP per worker (% change) 1.45 1.12 1.55 1.27 1.55 1.64 1.56 1.61 1.32 1.61
Total Factor Productivity (% change) 0.55 0.07 0.66 0.07 0.63 0.55 0.32 0.59 0.07 0.56
Financial Openness
De Jure 0.33 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.55 0.51 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.68
Assets & Liabilities 137.02 88.70 166.35 86.66 166.35 120.73 71.11 157.42 67.41 157.42
Assets 38.30 24.20 47.08 20.07 42.68 45.20 21.54 61.38 21.54 57.83
FDI & Equity 3.13 0.75 4.88 0.30 4.88 9.28 1.57 15.74 1.20 13.84
Debt 16.10 11.63 20.12 10.14 19.89 23.23 13.08 34.21 11.63 30.76
Liabilities 91.62 64.33 121.49 64.33 121.49 78.38 44.60 98.15 44.60 98.15
FDI & Equity 24.20 11.37 33.04 14.00 35.00 19.51 8.47 25.66 8.52 25.56
Debt 66.10 46.58 82.57 46.58 82.57 52.25 33.85 63.51 33.85 63.51
Less Financially Open Economies (LFO)
Real GDP per worker (% change) 1.64 2.15 1.54 2.14 1.42 1.39 1.63 1.00 2.35 1.10
Total Factor Productivity (% change) 0.36 0.40 0.22 0.40 0.27 0.33 0.15 0.34 0.49 0.47
Financial Openness
De Jure 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Assets & Liabilities 69.00 45.64 88.07 45.64 88.07 81.12 55.43 106.49 57.24 106.95
Assets 21.40 12.26 26.55 14.30 27.71 19.11 12.21 23.12 15.15 25.15
FDI & Equity 1.48 0.29 2.14 0.41 2.03 1.05 0.14 1.87 0.15 2.02
Debt 8.96 5.43 11.62 5.82 12.08 9.68 5.43 11.62 7.16 11.28
Liabilities 51.28 30.76 63.47 30.43 63.47 57.97 46.06 76.04 46.06 76.72
FDI & Equity 11.97 5.14 14.95 4.91 14.95 12.76 6.51 17.08 6.42 17.51
Debt 36.34 23.33 48.99 23.59 48.80 46.67 34.93 51.21 34.93 51.21
1966-1985 1986-2005 1986-2005 1966-2005 1966-1985 1986-2005 1966-2005 1966-1985 1986-2005 1966-1985







1.  A de facto measure (the ratio of the stock of external liabilities to GDP) is used to define MFO and LFO economies for the full sample (1966-2005). 
2.  A de facto measure (the ratio of the stock of external liabilities to GDP) is used to define MFO and LFO economies for each sub-period (1966-1985, 1986-2005). 
3.  A de jure measure (Schindler, 2007) is used to define MFO and LFO economies for the full sample (1966-2005). 
4.  A de jure measure (Schindler, 2007) is used to define MFO and LFO economies for each sub-period (1966-1985, 1986-2005).  
 
Table 2.  Financial Openness and TFP Growth: Cross-Section Regressions 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.01883*** -0.01821*** -0.01934*** -0.01873*** -0.01895*** -0.01891*** -0.01823*** -0.01849***
[0.00208] [0.00211] [0.00197] [0.00210] [0.00204] [0.00205] [0.00214] [0.00210]
Trade Openness (% GDP) -0.00001 0.00000 0.00007 0.00002 0.00005 0.00007 0.00002 0.00004
[0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00007] [0.00008] [0.00007]
Terms of Trade (% Change) 0.00129** 0.00131** 0.00114* 0.00130** 0.00123** 0.00117** 0.00132** 0.00126**
[0.00063] [0.00061] [0.00058] [0.00063] [0.00060] [0.00058] [0.00061] [0.00059]
Population Growth -0.00449*** -0.00458*** -0.00482*** -0.00469*** -0.00480*** -0.00483*** -0.00471*** -0.00480***
[0.00124] [0.00130] [0.00120] [0.00128] [0.00123] [0.00123] [0.00133] [0.00127]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00005 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 0.00006 0.00006 0.00007* 0.00007*
[0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004] [0.00004]
Institutional Quality 0.00067** 0.00068** 0.00071** 0.00069** 0.00070** 0.00071** 0.00069** 0.00070**
[0.00032] [0.00032] [0.00032] [0.00033] [0.00032] [0.00032] [0.00033] [0.00033]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) -0.00396 -0.00229 -0.00345 -0.00281
[0.00292] [0.00305] [0.00307] [0.00307]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00004 -0.00003
[0.00003] [0.00003]
Total Assets (% GDP) -0.00002 -0.00001
[0.00002] [0.00002]
Total Liabilities + Assets (% GDP) -0.00002 -0.00001
[0.00001] [0.00001]
R-squared 0.643 0.651 0.659 0.647 0.654 0.662 0.653 0.657
Observations 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
OLS
 
Note: The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of TFP over the full sample period, 1966-2005.  Total liabilities and assets refer to gross external 
liabilities and assets, respectively.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1%, levels, respectively.  
 
Table 3.  Financial Openness and TFP Growth: Panel Regressions 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth; ten-year panel) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.61287*** -0.61479*** -0.60842*** -0.61107*** -0.38540** -0.28090** -0.31093** -0.29027**
[0.08458] [0.08483] [0.08605] [0.08594] [0.16861] [0.11577] [0.12170] [0.11203]
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00498** 0.00454* 0.00387* 0.00412* 0.00175 0.00068 0.00219 0.00143
[0.00215] [0.00232] [0.00213] [0.00221] [0.00209] [0.00267] [0.00315] [0.00310]
Terms of Trade (% Change) 0.00177 0.00242 0.00259 0.00248 0.00255 0.00436 0.00451 0.00376
[0.00436] [0.00445] [0.00443] [0.00448] [0.00746] [0.00755] [0.00734] [0.00753]
Population Growth -0.02407 -0.01072 -0.02925 -0.02091 -0.06310 -0.03941 -0.04856 -0.04471
[0.04098] [0.04533] [0.04551] [0.04560] [0.05113] [0.06218] [0.07159] [0.06880]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00116** 0.00151** 0.00118** 0.00135** 0.00251** 0.00330*** 0.00335** 0.00323**
[0.00054] [0.00060] [0.00054] [0.00057] [0.00102] [0.00121] [0.00162] [0.00141]
Institutional Quality -0.00421 -0.00305 -0.00182 -0.00254 -0.01252 -0.01027 -0.01083 -0.00988
[0.00619] [0.00617] [0.00600] [0.00609] [0.01149] [0.01266] [0.01279] [0.01317]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.07373** 0.15476**
[0.03547] [0.06056]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00012 -0.00004
[0.00039] [0.00066]
Total Assets (% GDP) 0.00033 -0.00013
[0.00020] [0.00067]
Total Liabilities + Assets (% GDP) 0.00006 -0.00008
[0.00014] [0.00033]
R squared 0.674 0.664 0.667 0.664
Countries 67 67 67 67
Observations 252 254 254 254 252 254 254 254
Specification Tests (p-value)
Hansen Test of Overidentification 0.211 0.176 0.073 0.107
2nd Order Correlation 0.178 0.212 0.162 0.192
Number of Instruments 18 18 18 18
FE System GMM
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities and assets refer to gross external liabilities and assets, 
respectively.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, 
respectively.  All regressions include time dummies.  
 
Table 4.  Does the Composition of External Liabilities Matter? 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth; ten-year panel) 
FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.62192*** -0.40691*** -0.62104*** -0.39140*** -0.63541*** -0.25950**
[0.08526] [0.11832] [0.08417] [0.12317] [0.08321] [0.11885]
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00482* 0.00245 0.00465* 0.00125 0.00519** 0.00088
[0.00251] [0.00185] [0.00260] [0.00134] [0.00250] [0.00150]
Terms of Trade (% Change) 0.00176 0.00184 0.00268 -0.00121 0.00218 -0.00562
[0.00426] [0.00722] [0.00385] [0.00724] [0.00386] [0.00798]
Population Growth -0.00869 -0.10333*** -0.00497 -0.09451*** -0.00914 -0.05474
[0.04369] [0.03124] [0.04290] [0.03192] [0.04371] [0.04614]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00101* 0.00180* 0.00064 0.00128 0.00042 0.00065
[0.00058] [0.00093] [0.00063] [0.00092] [0.00060] [0.00094]
Institutional Quality -0.00275 -0.00938 -0.00261 -0.01273 0.00188 -0.00973
[0.00693] [0.00972] [0.00708] [0.00877] [0.00708] [0.00995]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.05249 0.08216* 0.03685 0.04967 0.02837 0.03830
[0.03849] [0.04638] [0.03741] [0.04595] [0.04312] [0.05047]
FDI & Equity Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00201*** 0.00379** -0.00141 0.00607*** 0.00022 0.00695***
[0.00066] [0.00161] [0.00190] [0.00220] [0.00246] [0.00207]
Debt Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00178** -0.00247** -0.00229* -0.00383*** -0.00305** -0.00378***









R squared 0.702 0.710 0.715
Countries 67 67 67
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248
Specification Tests (p-value)
Hansen Test of Overidentification 0.470 0.849 0.295
2nd Order Correlation 0.126 0.253 0.248
Number of Instruments 23 26 26
Institutional Quality * FDI & Equity 
Liabilities
Institutional Quality * Debt 
Liabilities
Private Sector Credit * FDI & 
Equity Liabilities
Private Sector Credit * Debt 
Liabilities
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities refer to gross 
external liabilities.  FDI and equity liabilities are the sum of gross FDI and gross portfolio equity liabilities.  Debt 
liabilities are gross external debt liabilities, including sovereign and portfolio debt.  Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, 
respectively.  All regressions include time dummies.  
 
Table 5.  Alternative Measures of TFP 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth; ten-year panel) 
FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.60149*** -0.59362*** -0.60872*** -0.55699*** -0.60672*** -0.66044*** -0.61106*** -0.61382***
[0.08691] [0.11164] [0.08697] [0.10428] [0.08573] [0.13988] [0.08650] [0.12082]
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00518** -0.00043 0.00468* 0.00143 0.00501** -0.00720 0.00453* -0.00213
[0.00230] [0.00380] [0.00254] [0.00335] [0.00228] [0.00723] [0.00251] [0.00561]
Terms of Trade (% Change) 0.00164 0.00635 0.00167 0.00305 0.00167 0.00460 0.00172 0.00260
[0.00436] [0.00545] [0.00427] [0.00618] [0.00438] [0.00722] [0.00432] [0.00621]
Population Growth -0.01846 -0.12318** -0.00988 -0.12675** -0.02071 -0.20741** -0.01178 -0.21611***
[0.04597] [0.05764] [0.04392] [0.05805] [0.04569] [0.09012] [0.04373] [0.07733]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00127** 0.00592** 0.00104* 0.00399* 0.00122** 0.00442* 0.00099* 0.00371**
[0.00061] [0.00256] [0.00059] [0.00234] [0.00060] [0.00241] [0.00058] [0.00184]
Institutional Quality -0.00469 0.00471 -0.00291 0.00892 -0.00488 0.02232 -0.00307 0.01893
[0.00634] [0.01696] [0.00689] [0.01430] [0.00630] [0.01957] [0.00682] [0.01530]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.07381** 0.15018*** 0.05094 0.06897 0.06975* 0.19215* 0.04715 0.10460
[0.03567] [0.04906] [0.03863] [0.05542] [0.03509] [0.10779] [0.03765] [0.09572]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00017 -0.00014 -0.00010 0.00171
[0.00037] [0.00151] [0.00037] [0.00107]
FDI & Equity Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00198*** 0.00492** 0.00203*** 0.00415*
[0.00067] [0.00206] [0.00066] [0.00240]
Debt Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00175** -0.00259 -0.00167** 0.00003
[0.00071] [0.00179] [0.00070] [0.00167]
R squared 0.674 0.700 0.682 0.706
Countries
Observations 252 252 248 248 252 252 248 248
Specification Tests (p-value)
Hansen Test of Overidentification 0.237 0.549 0.334 0.708
2nd Order Correlation 0.140 0.143 0.113 0.102
Number of Instruments 26 28 22 25
Gollin Bernanke and Gurkaynak
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities refer to gross external liabilities.  FDI and equity liabilities are the 
sum of gross FDI and gross portfolio equity liabilities.  Debt liabilities are gross external debt liabilities, including sovereign and portfolio debt.  Robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.  All regressions include time 
dummies.  The results in this table are based on TFP calculations that rely on capital share parameters taken from Gollin (2002) and Bernanke and Gurkaynak 
(2002), respectively.  
 
Table 6.  Alternative Measures of Capital Account Openness 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth; ten-year panel) 
FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.61118*** -0.30791** -0.62038*** -0.36038*** -0.61888*** -0.34171*** -0.62332*** -0.36847***
[0.08443] [0.14454] [0.08566] [0.11055] [0.08377] [0.11285] [0.08451] [0.11978]
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00529** -0.00063 0.00484* 0.00175 0.00446* 0.00086 0.00429* 0.00185
[0.00228] [0.00200] [0.00251] [0.00174] [0.00229] [0.00260] [0.00251] [0.00180]
Terms of Trade (% Change) 0.0002 0.00409 0.00039 -0.00125 0.0022 0.00268 0.00209 -0.00056
[0.00473] [0.00803] [0.00464] [0.00672] [0.00442] [0.00738] [0.00430] [0.00715]
Population Growth -0.01729 -0.07419* -0.00999 -0.10156*** -0.00619 -0.04745 -0.00109 -0.07755*
[0.04581] [0.04314] [0.04393] [0.02807] [0.04667] [0.06332] [0.04407] [0.04295]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00125** 0.00285** 0.00103* 0.00124 0.00127* 0.00276** 0.00102 0.00136
[0.00061] [0.00125] [0.00058] [0.00102] [0.00066] [0.00130] [0.00065] [0.00107]
Institutional Quality -0.00567 -0.01384 -0.00362 -0.01546* -0.0027 -0.01009 -0.00138 -0.00647
[0.00646] [0.01022] [0.00689] [0.00798] [0.00626] [0.01428] [0.00673] [0.00813]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.02895** 0.03059 0.02184* 0.01885 0.04532 0.09231 0.02669 0.07075
[0.01308] [0.01861] [0.01298] [0.01758] [0.03849] [0.08015] [0.04131] [0.04417]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00015 0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00021
[0.00039] [0.00079] [0.00039] [0.00065]
FDI & Equity Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00195*** 0.00446*** 0.00211*** 0.00383***
[0.00068] [0.00134] [0.00069] [0.00112]
Debt Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00172** -0.00230** -0.00181** -0.00201***
[0.00070] [0.00091] [0.00073] [0.00073]
R squared 0.676 0.703 0.667 0.697
Countries 67 67 67 67
Observations 249 249 245 245 254 254 250 250
Specification Tests (p-value)
Hansen Test of Overidentification 0.193 0.829 0.17 0.505
2nd Order Correlation 0.159 0.144 0.262 0.166
Number of Instruments 20 22 20 22
Chinn-Ito Bekaert-Harvey
 
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities refer to gross external liabilities.  FDI and equity liabilities are the 
sum of gross FDI and gross portfolio equity liabilities.  Debt liabilities are gross external debt liabilities, including sovereign and portfolio debt.  Robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.  All regressions include time 
dummies.  The de jure capital account openness measures used in this table are taken from Chinn and Ito (2006) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000), respectively. 
 
Table 7.  Financial Openness and TFP Growth in 4on-Industrial Countries 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth; ten-year panel) 
FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.61041*** -0.70596*** -0.60632*** -0.72480*** -0.62060*** -0.65166***
[0.09976] [0.13773] [0.09136] [0.15193] [0.09473] [0.13287]
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00401 0.00112 0.00657** 0.01056* 0.00616* 0.00390
[0.00261] [0.00354] [0.00280] [0.00540] [0.00307] [0.00411]
Terms of Trade (% Change) 0.00249 0.00715 0.00378 0.00614 0.00241 0.00304
[0.00484] [0.00927] [0.00406] [0.00752] [0.00424] [0.00850]
Population Growth -0.02886 -0.06079 -0.00485 -0.00123 -0.00676 -0.03008
[0.05899] [0.10726] [0.06159] [0.10128] [0.05777] [0.08372]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00168 0.00484* 0.00155 0.00252 0.00087 0.00101
[0.00117] [0.00258] [0.00124] [0.00350] [0.00149] [0.00275]
Institutional Quality -0.00298 -0.01341 -0.00166 -0.01298 0.00093 -0.01929
[0.00722] [0.01417] [0.00760] [0.01667] [0.00793] [0.01621]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.05742 0.20021** 0.00508 0.07715 0.01880 0.07019
[0.05447] [0.08287] [0.07795] [0.10578] [0.06945] [0.11795]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00312** -0.00566***
[0.00133] [0.00198]
FDI & Equity Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00001 0.00419
[0.00271] [0.00560]
Debt Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00315** -0.00602***
[0.00129] [0.00177]
R squared 0.668 0.708 0.706
Countries 46 46 46
Observations 172 172 172 172 170 170
Specification Tests (p-value)
Hansen Test of Overidentification 0.308 0.285 0.216
2nd Order Correlation 0.146 0.593 0.545
Number of Instruments 19 21 23
 
  Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities refer to gross external liabilities.  FDI and 
equity liabilities are the sum of gross FDI and gross portfolio equity liabilities.  Debt liabilities are gross external debt liabilities, including 
sovereign and portfolio debt.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.  All regressions include time dummies.  
 
Table 8.  Is There a Threshold Level of Financial Integration? 
(Dependent variable -- TFP growth; ten-year panel) 
FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM FE System GMM
Initial TFP (in logs) -0.60439*** -0.73186*** -0.61165*** -0.79261*** -0.63904*** -0.41564*** -0.63121*** -0.45355***
[0.06264] [0.09904] [0.06560] [0.10508] [0.19912] [0.15177] [0.20027] [0.15780]
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00539** 0.00541 0.00408 0.00609 0.00595 -0.00305 0.00579 -0.00259
[0.00262] [0.00339] [0.00314] [0.00554] [0.00481] [0.00557] [0.00506] [0.00551]
Terms of Trade (% Change) -0.00270 -0.00587 -0.00102 -0.00609 0.00402 0.00503 0.00377 0.00331
[0.00924] [0.00922] [0.00894] [0.00378] [0.00324] [0.00884] [0.00356] [0.01200]
Population Growth -0.09477* -0.18422* -0.09668** -0.17830*** 0.06460 -0.09675 0.06429 -0.02233
[0.05518] [0.09056] [0.04721] [0.06022] [0.06974] [0.12748] [0.07012] [0.11833]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00057 0.00601* 0.00041 0.00245 0.00266** 0.00118 0.00259** 0.00232
[0.00079] [0.00322] [0.00085] [0.00244] [0.00121] [0.00208] [0.00126] [0.00362]
Institutional Quality -0.01249 -0.00952 -0.01070 0.00641 -0.00348 -0.01267 -0.00225 -0.00905
[0.01380] [0.02277] [0.01333] [0.01374] [0.00902] [0.01764] [0.00946] [0.02355]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.12139** 0.24200*** 0.07183 0.08496 0.00092 0.14501 0.00076 0.14827
[0.04834] [0.08750] [0.05264] [0.08367] [0.04884] [0.11039] [0.04839] [0.12966]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00006 -0.00199 -0.00178 -0.00183
[0.00031] [0.00166] [0.00133] [0.00242]
FDI & Equity Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00233*** 0.00515** -0.00178 -0.00399
[0.00078] [0.00226] [0.00298] [0.00954]
Debt Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00158** -0.00360* -0.00158 -0.00173
[0.00072] [0.00179] [0.00153] [0.00355]
R squared 0.735 0.780 0.660 0.656
Countries 33 33 34 34
Observations 123 123 121 121 129 129 127 127
Specification Tests (p-value)
Hansen Test of Overidentification 0.484 0.959 0.327 0.572
2nd Order Correlation 0.800 0.412 0.168 0.216




Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities refer to gross external liabilities.  FDI and equity liabilities are the 
sum of gross FDI and gross portfolio equity liabilities.  Debt liabilities are gross external debt liabilities, including sovereign and portfolio debt.  Robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.  All regressions include time 
dummies.  
 
Table 9.  Effects on TFP Growth at Different Horizons 
(Dependent variable -- Average annual TFP growth over different horizons) 
Horizon (in years) 3 5 7 10 15
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.00775* 0.00716* 0.00677* 0.00525 0.00414
[0.00397] [0.00381] [0.00347] [0.00385] [0.00425]
FDI & Equity Liabilities (% GDP) 0.00027*** 0.00023*** 0.00017*** 0.00020*** 0.00015**
[0.00007] [0.00006] [0.00005] [0.00007] [0.00006]
Debt Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00024*** -0.00021*** -0.00018*** -0.00018** -0.00013*
[0.00007] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00007] [0.00006]
R-squared 0.359 0.526 0.533 0.702 0.763
Observations 742 487 362 248 185
 
  Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of TFP averaged over each period.  Total liabilities refer to gross 
external liabilities.  FDI and equity liabilities are the sum of gross FDI and gross portfolio equity liabilities.  Debt liabilities 
are gross external debt liabilities, including sovereign and portfolio debt.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  
The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.  All regressions 
include time dummies and the full set of control variables as in Table 4.  
 
Table 10.  Financial Openness and TFP Growth: Difference-in-Differences  
(Dependent variable -- TFP [in logs] ; ten-year panel) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade Openness (% GDP) 0.00629** 0.00712*** 0.00635** 0.00688** 0.00554** 0.00644** 0.00558** 0.00614** 0.00563** 0.00649** 0.00569** 0.00615**
[0.00241] [0.00265] [0.00248] [0.00261] [0.00252] [0.00277] [0.00258] [0.00271] [0.00238] [0.00261] [0.00242] [0.00252]
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 0.00101 0.00136 0.00104 0.00130 0.00145 0.00180 0.00148 0.00175 0.00187* 0.00230** 0.00195* 0.00224**
[0.00103] [0.00109] [0.00108] [0.00109] [0.00104] [0.00108] [0.00108] [0.00108] [0.00097] [0.00105] [0.00104] [0.00105]
Institutional Quality -0.00236 -0.00123 -0.00264 -0.00270 -0.00114 0.00001 -0.00135 -0.00147 -0.00187 -0.00080 -0.00223 -0.00210
[0.01117] [0.01087] [0.01145] [0.01122] [0.01067] [0.01030] [0.01099] [0.01065] [0.01135] [0.01121] [0.01172] [0.01150]
Capital Account Openness (de jure) 0.15967***0.15778***0.16108***0.16316*** 0.04553** 0.04536***0.04588**0.04691*** 0.06849 0.05898 0.07064 0.06838
[0.04915] [0.04765] [0.04946] [0.04869] [0.01729] [0.01635] [0.01764] [0.01712] [0.04386] [0.04301] [0.04420] [0.04439]
Total Liabilities (% GDP) -0.00094 -0.00099 -0.00092
[0.00091] [0.00089] [0.00093]
Total Assets (% GDP) -0.00015 -0.00012 -0.00021
[0.00069] [0.00073] [0.00076]
Total Liabilities + Assets (% GDP) -0.00047 -0.00048 -0.00044
[0.00053] [0.00053] [0.00051]
R squared 0.971 0.972 0.971 0.972 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
Countries 67 67 67 67 66 66 66 66 67 67 67 67




Note: The dependent variable is the level of TFP averaged over each 10 year period.  Total liabilities and assets refer to gross external liabilities and assets, 
respectively.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, levels, respectively.  
All regressions include country fixed effects and time dummies.  
 
Table A1.  Summary Statistics 
TFP (% change) 0.39 1.85 0.68 1.49 0.26 2.14 0.52 1.69
Trade Openness (% GDP) 28.74 14.23 34.52 16.64 28.13 13.95 33.64 16.14
Population Growth 1.73 1.04 1.34 0.85 2.24 0.81 1.70 0.75
Terms of Trade (% change) -0.36 3.43 -0.28 3.11 -0.49 4.01 -0.58 3.55
Volatility of Terms of Trade 9.74 7.80 6.50 5.33 12.18 8.06 8.18 5.43
Private Sector Credit (% GDP) 42.62 34.32 57.37 43.55 28.33 22.35 37.16 32.11
Institutional Quality 9.37 4.07 9.73 3.29 7.21 2.57 7.82 1.69
De Jure
IMF * 0.32 0.42 0.53 0.48 0.21 0.36 0.35 0.45
Chinn-Ito 0.13 1.42 0.92 1.54 -0.39 1.13 0.21 1.33
Edwards 58.27 24.16 74.40 22.11 49.02 20.27 65.27 20.37
Equity Market Liberalization ** 0.32 0.43 0.65 0.48 0.18 0.36 0.50 0.50
De Facto
Total Assets & Liabilities (% GDP) 117.38 120.54 197.45 193.51 90.74 48.69 121.55 46.11
Assets (% GDP) 41.76 64.59 78.39 106.90 22.53 15.98 33.53 18.62
FDI & Equity (% GDP) 9.65 22.68 23.96 38.62 2.26 5.14 5.13 7.91
Debt (% GDP) 24.14 44.27 43.88 74.41 11.48 9.74 16.29 11.57
Liabilities 75.62 62.10 119.06 91.19 68.21 39.85 88.02 38.45
FDI & Equity (% GDP) 21.19 28.34 42.93 44.74 17.61 17.04 29.89 19.97
Debt (% GDP) 53.50 39.98 76.37 52.56 49.20 31.76 59.13 30.51
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Full Sample Non-Industrial Countries
1966-2005 1996-2005 1966-2005 1996-2005
 
* Schindler, 2007 
** Bekaert and Harvey, 2000 
 
Figure 1a. Growth Accounting for More and Less Financially Open Economies 













Notes: A de facto measure of financail integration (the ratio of the stock of external liabilities to GDP) is used to 
define MFO and LFO conomies. MFO and LFO refer to More Financially Open and Less Financially Open 
economies, respectively. 
 
Figure 1b. Growth Accounting for More and Less Financially Open Economies 














  Notes:  A  de  jure  measure  of  capital  account  openness  (Schindler,  2007)  is  used  to  define  MFO  and  LFO 
economies. MFO and LFO refer to More Financially Open and Less Financially Open economies, respectively. 
Real GDP per worker TFP contribution K/Y Contribution  H Contribution 
 
Figure 2. Growth Accounting for More and Less Financially Open Economies 



















Real GDP per worker TFP contribution K/Y Contribution H Contribution
 
  Notes:  Pre-globalization,  1966-1985;  Globalization,  1986-2005.  A  de  facto  measure  of  financial 
integration  (the  ratio  of  the  stock  of  external  liabilities  to  GDP)  is  used  to  define  MFO  and  LFO 
economies.  MFO  and  LFO  refer  to  More  Financially  Open  and  Less  Financially  Open  economies, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 3. Growth Accounting for More and Less Financially Open Economies 



















Real GDP per worker TFP contribution K/Y Contribution H Contribution
 
  Notes: Pre-globalization, 1966-1985; Globalization, 1986-2005. A de jure measure of capital account 
openness (Schindler, 2007) is used to define MFO and LFO economies. MFO and LFO refer to More 
Financially Open and Less Financially Open economies, respectively. 
 